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INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT 
On this appeal, defendant All American Life Insurance Company seeks to set 
aside a default judgment of over $92,000. The district court denied relief despite a 
showing that (1) service of process is disputed; (2) All American had no actual notice of 
the action, and therefore no culpability in failing to respond; (3) plaintiff waited sixteen 
months before notifying All American of the judgment, with the apparent intent of 
foreclosing Rule 60(b) remedies; and (4) All American has an absolute defense on the 
merits or the claim, which would have precluded any liability had notice of the action 
been received. All American demonstrated in its opening brief that these circumstances 
more than justify relief under Rule 60(b). Plaintiff has failed to identify any reason, in 
law or equity, that justifies denial of relief. 
The common thread running through all the cases is that if a party is defaulted 
through no fault of its own, that party has a meritorious defense, and the judgment can be 
set aside with little or no prejudice to the opposing party, equity and justice favor relief 
from the judgment to allow the claims to be decided on the merits. See 12 Moore's 
Federal Practice § 60.22[3][b] (1998). Therefore, this Court should reverse the district 
court's ruling and remand the case for consideration on the merits. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE JUDICIAL POLICY OF LIBERALITY IN GRANTING 
RELIEF FROM DEFAULT JUDGMENTS APPLIES 
REGARDLESS OF THE SUBSTANTIVE BASIS FOR RELIEF 
UNDER RULE 60(b). 
All American demonstrated in its opening brief that default judgments are not 
favored in the law, and that Utah courts are "generally indulgent" and "liberal" in setting 
them aside where there is a reasonable justification for nonappearance and timely 
application for relief is made. See, e.g., Interstate Excavating, Inc. v. AGLA 
Development Corp., 611 P.2d 369, 371 (Utah 1980); Erickson v. Schenkers International 
Forwarders, Inc., 882 P.2d 1147, 1149 (Utah 1994); (Br. of App. 10-11). Plaintiff 
argues that this judicial policy of "liberality and indulgence" in granting relief from 
default judgments applies only when relief is sought under Rule 60(b)(1), and not when 
sought under 60(b)(4) or (6). (Br. of Aplee. 7-14.) However, the argument is misleading 
and has no merit. 
Plaintiff confuses the substantive grounds for 60(b) relief from judgments 
generally with the judicial policy toward relief from default judgments specifically. The 
policy of liberality in setting aside default judgments serves the desired end of according 
litigants a hearing on the merits, in furtherance of time-honored principles of due process 
and in recognition of the truth that a judgment "without a hearing is obviously a harsh 
and oppressive thing." Mayhew v. Standard Gilsonite Co., 376 P.2d 951, 952 (Utah 
1962). Accordingly, this policy is the beginning point in every case seeking relief from a 
default judgment, regardless of the specific substantive grounds asserted under 60(b) to 
justify relief. The language of liberality in the cases dealing with relief from default 
judgments is never limited to any particular section of 60(b); rather, the policy is 
observed in every default judgment case to assist the court in applying the specific 
substantive grounds for relief. The effect of the policy is not to ignore or supplant the 
grounds for relief under 60(b), but to avoid an overly-strict application of the grounds, 
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with the result that close cases and "doubts" regarding the propriety of relief are decided 
in favor of the moving party, and thus in favor of a decision on the merits. See, e.g., 
Interstate Excavating, supra, at 371; Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah 1986) (doubt 
should h' ivsohnl in l.i','ir of relief IZ Moore's Federal Practice, supra. § 6Q.22[3jl »]. 
Resolution of disputes on the merits, when fairly possible, is founded not only on. 
traditional due process protections, but on the guarantee in our Utah Constitution that 
"no person shall be barred from . . . defending . . . any civil cause to which he is a party." 
Art. I, Sec. 11. See Interstate Excavating, supra, 611 P.2d at 371 (citing this provision in 
support of relief from a default judgment: "[A]ccess to the courts for the protection of 
rights and the settlement of disputes is one of the most important factors in the 
maintenance of a peaceable and well-ordered society."). Taking a judgment without a 
hearing is tantamount to barring a claim without a hearing; stated otherwise, access to 
courts for defense of a claim is just as vital as access to courts for pursuit of a claim. (See 
Br. of App. 11, n.4.) Plaintiff objects to this argument for a hearing, claiming that it was 
not raised below and that All American received "sufficient notice." (Br. of Aplee. 11.) 
However, the right to a hearing on the merits of its defense was at the heart of All 
American's arguments below (R. 104-05, 107-08, 200-02, 211-12), and All American 
relies on the open courts provision of the Constitution as merely additional authority for 
that same argument. In any event, the first-on-appeal rule has "clearly defined 
exceptions, including cases presenting "plain error or exceptional circumstances." In re 
R.N J., 908 P.2d 345, 350 (Utah App. 1995). This is such a case. As for the assertion 
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that All American received constructive notice of this action, that is the central disputed 
factual issue of the case and cannot be merely assumed. 
Regarding the substantive standard for relief under Rule 60(b)(4), plaintiff 
concedes that "[w]hether the defendant was served is a question of fact," and that if 
service was lacking the judgment is void "as a matter of law." (Br. of Aplee. 11-12.) 
Accordingly, in view of the factual dispute over service of process, that dispute raises 
sufficient question or doubt to justify granting relief from the default judgment. At the 
very least, the factual dispute over service justifies remand for an evidentiary hearing on 
that issue. (Br. of App. 14, n.5.) See Interstate Excavating, supra, 611 P.2d at 371 
(dispute over service of notice justified relief from default judgment to allow evidentiary 
hearing); May v. Thompson, 677 P.2d 1109, 1110 (Utah 1984) (factual dispute over 
service of process justified relief from default judgment); Woody v. Rhodes, 461 P.2d 
465, 466 (Utah 1969) (dispute over service of process justified relief from default 
judgment); Locke v. Peterson, 285 P.2d 1111, 1113 (Utah 1955) (dispute over service of 
process justified relief from default judgment). See also Davis v. Musler, 713 F.2d 907, 
916 (2nd Cir. 1983) ("This court has never hesitated to reverse the denial of a motion to 
vacate a default judgment where further factfinding was necessary to ensure that 
substantial justice was served."). 
Regarding the standard for relief under Rule 60(b)(6), plaintiff argues that the 
movant must demonstrate "exceptional circumstances," citing Laub v. South Central 
Utah Tel Ass % 657 P.2d 1304 (Utah 1982). (Br. of Aplee. 13.) However, Laub did not 
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involve relief from a default judgment. While the cited standard may be applied to relief 
from other types of judgments, it is not strictly applied to default judgments. See, e.g., 
Gregorian v. Izvestia,%l\ F.2d 1515, 1526 (9th Cir. 1989) ("The district court erred in 
requiring defendants to demonstrate the existence of'extraordinary circumstances' in . . . 
order to obtain relief from the default judgment."). Even if applied, the "extraordinary 
circumstances" standard is satisfied by a showing that no other basis for relief under 
60(b) exists, and that the movant is without fault. See 12 Moore's Federal Practice, 
supra, §§ 60.48[2] and [3][bJ; National Credit Union Admin, v. Gray, 1 F.3d 262, 266 
(4th Cir. 1993) (relief from judgment entered without knowledge or fault of the movant 
"is the type of extraordinary case for which Rule 60(b)(6) was designed"). Under the 
judicial policy of liberality in granting relief from default judgments, even a "slight 
abuse" of discretion is sufficient to reverse the lower court's denial of relief. See, e.g., 
United Coin Meter Co. v. Seaboard Coastline Railroad, 705 F.2d 839, 846 (6 th Cir. 
1983) ("a 'glaring abuse' of discretion is not required for reversal of a court's refusal to 
relieve a party of the harsh sanction of default"); Blume v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 
791 P.2d 784, 785 (Mont. 1990) ("no great abuse of discretion need be shown to warrant 
reversal" of a lower court's refusal to set aside a default judgment; a "slight abuse" is 
sufficient). 
In summary, plaintiff has presented no basis for this Court to depart from the 
accepted standard of liberality in granting relief from default judgments in order to 
resolve disputes on the merits. Where service of process is disputed under 60(b)(4), that 
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liberality requires reversal to allow for a trial on the merits, or at least an evidentiary 
hearing on the issue of service. The same indulgent standard applies to relief under 
60(b)(6). This case presents extraordinary circumstances where no other basis for relief 
exists, and All American is admittedly without fault. To deny relief from the default 
judgment under these circumstances is at least a "slight abuse" of discretion. 
POINT II: RELIEF UNDER 60(b)(4) IS JUSTIFIED BECAUSE SERVICE OF 
PROCESS IS DISPUTED AND, CONSEQUENTLY, THE 
VALIDITY OF THE JUDGMENT IS IN DOUBT. 
All American demonstrated in its opening brief that relief is mandated under Rule 
60(b)(4) because the default judgment is void, having been entered without service of 
process and, therefore, without jurisdiction. (Br. of App. 12-14.) Plaintiff responds that 
relief is not justified because the constable "unquestionably" served All American's 
agent for process, CT Corp. (Br. of Aplee. 15.) However, the word "unquestionably" 
means without question or dispute, and here, service on CT Corp. is plainly disputed; 
therefore, the default judgment cannot be allowed to stand in the face of that dispute. 
Plaintiff argues that the constable's affidavit establishes service on CT Corp., and 
that All American failed to "overcome" that affidavit with clear and convincing 
evidence. (Br. of Aplee. 15-20.) However, the authorities cited by plaintiff refer to a 
sheriffs return of service, deference to which is based on statute, U.C.A. § \1-22-12. All 
American has located no similar statute pertaining to a mere constable, who, unlike a 
sheriff, earns his livelihood from the collection of service fees, 17-25a-4; 21-3-3, and 
therefore has an inherent conflict of interest in any dispute over service. Even if a 
6 
constable's return of service is entitled to the same presumption of correctness as thai a 
a sheriff, the presumption is rebuttable and may be discredited by competent evidence. 
See Carries v. Carries, 668 P.2d 555, 557 (Utah 1983); Haberman v. Washington Public 
Power Supply System,! AAV * * •• * iy, SMS Financial \ l? •"' "".' 
918 P.2d 400, 403 (Okla. App. 1995). Moreover, an affidavit denying service is 
competent evidence sufficient to discredit the affidavit of service to the contrary. Carnes 
and Haberman, supra. Most importantly, the invalidity or absence of service of process 
need not be shown by clear and convincing evidence at the motion stage] rather, "the 
appellant needs only to show that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether 
he was served." Carnes, supra, at 557 (conflicting affidavits on the fact of service in the 
analogous summary judgment context require an evidentiary hearing to resolve the 
issue). 
Application of a particular evidentiary standard for contesting an affidavit of 
service inherently assumes the weighing of evidence and the judging of credibility, 
functions that can be accomplished only by a trier of fact in an evidentiary hearing. 
Plaintiffs own cited authorities arose from evidentiary hearings on the disputed service. 
See Reed v. Reed, 806 P.2d 1182, 1183-84 (Utah 1991) (parties submitted conflicting 
affidavits on service of process, after which court conducted evidentiary hearing and 
made findings of fact "based upon a judgment of the credibility of the witnesses"); 
Slomowitz v. Walker, 429 So. 2d 797, 798 (Fla. App. 1983) (evidentiary hearing 
followed defendant's motion to set aside default judgment based on disputed service of 
7 
process). In fact, All American has found no case, and plaintiff has cited none, in which 
an appellate court has approved resolution of a factual dispute over service of process 
without an evidentiary hearing. Rather, the cases uniformly vacate the default judgment 
or remand for a hearing to resolve the issue based on the weight of the evidence and 
credibility of the witnesses. See, e.g., Interstate Excavating, supra, 611 P.2d at 371; May 
v. Thompson, 677 P.2d at 1110; Woody, supra, 461 P.2d at 466; Locke, supra, 285 P.2d 
at 1113; Davis, supra, 713 F.2d at 916. See also Wood v. Weenig, 736 P.2d 1053, 1054 
(Utah App. 1987) (court held evidentiary hearing on whether default judgment should be 
set aside based on disputed service of process). 
Despite this clear authority for a hearing on disputes over service of process, 
plaintiff argues that no hearing is necessary in this case because the Affidavit of Sandy 
Streeper, the CT Corp. supervisor who denied service of process, is inadequate to 
contradict the constable's affidavit. (Br. of Aplee. 18-19.) However, Ms. Streeper 
affirms that she is "the person responsible for overseeing CT's receipt of legal notices, 
the recording of such receipt in our computer system, and the forwarding of those 
documents to the proper corporate entity," (R. 143, ^  4); that when such documents are 
received, "it is CT's regular practice to enter the documents' relevant information into 
CT's computer database," (id. ^ 5); that she "conducted a search to determine if our 
office has any record of receiving a summons and complaint issued by Classic Cabinets, 
Inc. and directed to All American Insurance Company," (id. ^ 6); and that she "searched 
CT's computer database under the name 'All American Insurance Company' [and] found 
8 
no record that our office had been served on behalf of All American Insurance 
Company"' {id. f^ 7, emp. added). She concludes that "no summons or complaint was 
received by CT on behalf of All American Insurance Company" and, therefore, "no 
summons or complaint was ever forwarded by CT * nVnn fnviir;n 
(Id. f^ 9, emp. added.) Accordingly, this affidavit is more than sufficient to "discredit" or 
contradict the constable's affidavit and to require setting aside of the default judgment or 
an evidentiary hearing. See Carnes, supra, 668 P.2d at 557; Haberman, supra, 744 P.2d 
at 1074. Contrary to plaintiffs conclusion, the district court had no discretion to weigh 
evidence, judge credibility, and resolve this key evidentiary dispute without a hearing.1 
Finally, plaintiff cites Brown Grain and Livestock, Inc. v. Union Pacific Resource 
Co., 878 P.2d 157 (Colo. App. 1994), for the undisputed proposition that sendee c n a 
registered agent constitutes service on the principal. That case is easily distinguished on 
the basis that service on the defendant's designated agent was uncontested. The only 
issue was whether the defendant was bound by service to its agent when the agent 
negligently failed to notify the defendant of the action. Id. at 158. lii the present case, by 
contrast, where service on CT Corp. is disputed, we do not reach the legal effect of 
vicarious service. However, contrary to Brown Grain, most cases deciding the issue hold 
that a principal should be relieved from a default judgment entered as a result of an 
Plaintiff attempts to bypass the technical errors in the constable's return by arguing, again, that the 
issue was not raised in the district court. (Br. of Aplee. 20; see Br. of App. 6, n.3? 13-14.) However, All 
American did raise below the insufficiency of the constable's return (R. 6-7); All American does not 
raise a new issue by merely citing an additional omission in the return of service. "Issues" cannot be 
sliced so thin in applying the first-on-appeal rule. 
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agent's failure to notify the principal of the action. See, e.g., Sterling Drug, Inc. v. 
Wright, 342 So. 2d 503, 505 (Fla. 1977) (relief from default judgment based on 
defendant's lack of actual notice, diligence in moving to vacate, and size of the 
judgment); Blume v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 791 P.2d 784, 787 (Mont. 1990) (relief 
based on lack of defendant's own fault, size of the judgment, and meritorious defense); 
Clute v. A.B. Concrete, 587 P.2d 392, 395 (Mont. 1978) (relief based on the distinction 
that most cases denying relief do so because of the defendant's failure to act despite 
knowledge of the proceedings); see generally Annot., "Setting Aside Default Judgment 
for Failure of Statutory Agent On Whom Process Was Served to Notify Defendant," 20 
AJLR.2d 1179 (1951). 
In summary, relief is appropriate under 60(b)(4) for lack of, or at least disputed, 
service of process. Even if CT Corp. had been served, relief from the judgment would 
still be justified on equitable grounds, based on All American's lack of actual notice, its 
diligence in pursuing relief, its meritorious defense, and the size of the default judgment. 
POINT III: RELIEF UNDER RULE 60(b)(6) IS JUSTIFIED ON EQUITABLE 
GROUNDS TO ACCOMPLISH JUSTICE UNDER THE 
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE. 
All American demonstrated in its opening brief the equitable grounds for relief 
from the default judgment under Rule 60(b)(6). (Br. of App. 14-17.) Plaintiff responds 
that relief should be denied because the reason for relief is covered by subdivision (b)(4); 
no reason justifies relief; and the motion for relief is untimely. (Br. of Aplee. 23.) 
However, plaintiff misconstrues the facts and the law. 
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First, All American relies on both 60(b)(4) and (6) as alternative grounds for 
relief; if (4) applies, (6) is unnecessary, but if (4) is not deemed sufficient, then relief can 
still be granted under (6). As discussed above, subdivision (4) provides relief on the 
basis that the judgment is "void" for lack of service. As cited in All American's opening 
brief, some Utah cases have relied on this "void" provision to set aside default judgments 
on similar facts. (Br. of App. 12-13.) However, other Utah cases, also on similar facts, 
have granted relief either expressly under subdivision (6), or on general equitable 
grounds without specifying a particular subdivision, and therefore implicitly rely on 
subdivision (6). (Br. of App. 14-17.) One possible explanation for judicial reliance on 
two different grounds for relief on similar facts is the variation in evidence of defective 
service. Where the evidence is more clear or has been reduced to a factual finding, 
perhaps relief under subdivision (4) is more appropriate, while evidence that is 
conflicting and unresolved may be more appropriately addressed in the context of other 
equitable factors under subdivision (6). For example, in Locke v. Peterson, supra, the 
court granted relief without specifying the rule on which it relied: "This situation [of 
questionable service] created sufficient confusion that the motion to set aside the default 
and judgment. . . should have been granted." 285 P.2d at 1113. Likewise, in Security 
Adjustment Bureau v. West, 437 P.2d 214, 215-16 (Utah 1968), the court concluded: 
The fact that. . . there certainly was confusion in this case, together 
with an affidavit asserting failure to receive notice, plus a verified 
contention that West had a defense to the action, seems to us, that in the 
aggregate, the defendant. . . should be entitled to his day in court in 
consonance with the letter and spirit of the rules and authorities mentioned. 
[Emp. added.] 
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Accordingly, subdivision (b)(6) certainly is available as a basis for relief if subdivision 
(b)(4) is not. 
Second, the reasons presented for relief, taken "in the aggregate," do justify relief 
under 60(b)(6). Plaintiff asserts that relief should be denied because "service was proper 
and effective." (Br. of Aplee. 24.) However, as amply shown in All American's opening 
brief and in this reply brief, above, service is disputed and contested by sworn affidavit. 
That dispute, coupled with the undisputed facts that All American had no actual notice of 
the action or the judgment, All American has a meritorious defense to the action, and 
plaintiff has identified no prejudice that would result from setting aside the judgment, 
more than justify relief on equitable grounds. 
Third, the motion was timely, as set forth in All American's opening brief. (Br. of 
App. 18-21.) Plaintiff asserts that the motion was not brought within a reasonable time 
because of the passage of sixteen months between notifying CT Corp. of the judgment 
and All American's motion to set aside. (Br. of Aplee. 24.) However, plaintiff ignores 
the fact that All American had no actual notice of the judgment until July 1997, when 
plaintiffs counsel telephoned All American looking for money. Plaintiff has not even 
attempted to explain or justify that delay of sixteen months in giving actual notice of the 
judgment to All American. Given the time value of money, the only possible motivation 
plaintiff could have had for waiting was to prejudice All American's grounds for relief 
under Rule 60(b). As set forth in Workman v. Nagle Constr., Inc., 802 P.2d 749, 751 
(Utah App. 1990), and Central Bank & Trust Co. v. Jensen, 656 P.2d 1009, 1012 (Utah 
12 
1982), this motivation must at least be considered in determining timeliness of a motion 
for relief, and may even estop the plaintiff from contesting timeliness. 
Plaintiff contends that service of the notice of judgment on CT Corp. was 
sufficient to start the "timeliness" clock ticking. (Br. of Aplee. 26-28.) However, as set 
forth in All American's opening brief, Rules 55(a)(2), 58A(d), and 5(b)(1), Utah R. Civ.. 
P., construed together, require service of the notice of judgment on the "party" or party's 
attorney. (Br. of App. 19-20.) The statute regarding service of process on foreign 
corporations, 16-10a-1511, cited by plaintiff, does not purport to supersede the rules of 
civil procedure on service of subsequent pleadings in the action. As set forth in 
subsection (3) of that statute: 'This section does not prescribe the only means, or 
necessarily the required means, of serving a foreign corporation . . . ." (Emp. added.) 
Moreover, the agency contract signed by All American and CT Corp. specifies that the 
agency is only "for purposes of service of process." (R. 193.) Accordingly, service of 
the notice of judgment on CT Corp. was not legally sufficient to notify All American of 
the judgment.2 
Finally, plaintiff disputes that it concealed the judgment from All American. (Br. 
of Aplee. 29-30.) All American has no reason to believe that plaintiff set out in the 
beginning "to get a default judgment" (id. at 29); however, once the default was 
2
 Plaintiff quarrels over the sufficiency of the explanation offered by CT Corp. for not forwarding 
the notice of judgment to All American. (Br. of Aplee. 27-28.) However, this argument is immaterial if 
service of the notice on CT Corp. was improper to begin with. All American should not be held to 
constructive notice of information that CT Corp. was neither authorized to receive nor required to pass 
on. In any event, the facts are clear that All American received no actual notice of the judgment and, 
therefore, bears no culpability for "sitting idle," as argued by plaintiff. 
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obtained, the facts do indicate that plaintiff concealed the judgment for over sixteen 
months. Plaintiff wrote to All American regarding its claim in June 1994. (R. 13.) All 
American responded in July 1994, asserting the defense that the 10-day period for 
premium refunds had expired and requesting further information on other matters. (R. 
140.) Plaintiff did not respond. (R. 113.) All American sent another letter to plaintiff in 
September 1994, closing the matter. (R. 141.) Plaintiff did not respond. (R. 114.) 
Plaintiff now claims that its counsel sent a subsequent letter requesting information from 
All American (R. 176), but All American received no such letter (R. 114). All American 
did not hear from plaintiff again until July 1997, when plaintiffs counsel called for 
collection. (R. 114, 178.) The point is, plaintiff and its counsel knew how to, and did, 
contact All American both before the action and after obtaining the judgment; therefore, 
plaintiffs failure to notify All American of the judgment between February 1996 and 
July 1997 can only be viewed as purposeful. In view of these facts, plaintiff cannot be 
heard to complain that All American's motion for relief from the judgment is untimely.3 
In summary, the grounds for relief under 60(b)(6) are satisfied. Relief may not be 
available under (b)(4), depending on this Court's view of the case; the facts and 
Plaintiff again asserts that certain details of All American's legal arguments in connection with 
timeliness of the motion were not made to the district court. (Br. of Aplee. 27, 29.) However, the issue 
of timeliness of the motion was admittedly argued and decided below. (R. 106-07, 207-08). An appellant 
is not bound to reproduce on appeal an argument identical in every detail to that presented in the district 
court; rather, the appellant is free, and should be encouraged, to augment and enhance the argument on 
appeal with additional factual and legal support to assist the appellate court with a more thorough 
examination of the issue. That is all that was done here; the issue is the same, and the general argument 
is the same. 
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circumstances of this case certainly justify relief; and the motion for relief is timely 
because any delay is attributable to plaintiffs concealment of the judgment. 
POINT IV: ALL AMERICAN'S MERITORIOUS DEFENSE MUST BE 
CONSIDERED IN DECIDING WHETHER TO SET ASIDE THE 
DEFAULT JUDGMENT. 
Plaintiff argues that All American's absolute defense to plaintiffs claim should 
not be considered in deciding whether to grant relief from the default judgment. (Br. of 
Aplee. 30-32.) However, in presenting the merits of its defense, All American is simply 
relying on the requirements for relief set out in State v. Musselman, 667 P.2d 1053, 
1055-56 (Utah 1983): 
In order for defendant to be relieved from the default judgment, he 
must not only show that the judgment was entered against him through 
excusable neglect (or any other reason specified in Rule 60(b)), but he must 
also show that his motion to set aside the judgment was timely, and that he 
has a meritorious defense to the action. [Emp. added.] 
Accordingly, if plaintiff is arguing that the meritorious defense cannot be considered at 
all, plaintiff is wrong. If plaintiff is arguing that the meritorious defense should not be 
considered until a basis for 60(b) relief is established, that point is not disputed. 
However, the meritorious defense requirement has no application to 60(b)(4), relief 
being mandated by a determination that the judgment is void. 12 Moore's Federal 
Practice, supra, § 60.44[5][b] (the precondition of a meritorious defense "does not apply 
when the ground asserted for relief is that the judgment is void"). Finally, it should be 
noted that, in this digressive argument, plaintiff does not dispute that All American's 
defense is meritorious. 
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POINT V: IF THIS COURT DOES NOT GRANT COMPLETE RELIEF FROM 
THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT, AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON 
THE ISSUE OF SERVICE IS REQUIRED TO ACCOMPLISH 
JUSTICE. 
Plaintiff seeks to avoid an evidentiary hearing for various reasons, not the least of 
which is the merit of All American's defense. (Br. of Aplee. 32-39.) However, a 
summary of the alternative forms of relief available to this Court is necessary to place the 
hearing argument in context. 
This Court can grant relief from the default judgment in two alternative degrees. 
First, a complete relief, obviously preferred by All American, would be to set aside the 
default judgment and remand the case to the district court to allow All American to 
answer and defend the claim on the merits. This relief would obviate an evidentiary 
hearing on service of process and place the parties in an immediate position to contest the 
merits, either by summary judgment or trial. By contrast, an incomplete relief, the 
minimum necessary to accomplish justice, would be to set aside the default judgment and 
remand the case for an evidentiary hearing on the contested issue of service of process. 
This relief would, in essence, require the district court to reconsider its decision based on 
the evidence received at the hearing. Depending on the outcome of the reconsidered 
ruling, the parties could either proceed to a determination of the merits or pursue a 
possible second appeal. Accordingly, in terms of efficiency and economy, for the parties 
and the courts, the complete form of relief is preferred and has most often been followed 
by the courts. For the purpose of clarity, then, the "evidentiary hearing" discussed here is 
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a proposed hearing on the disputed service of process, made necessary only if this Court 
does not grant complete relief. 
Plaintiffs arguments against such a limited hearing, if necessary, have no merit. 
First, plaintiff argues that no hearing is necessary because the sufficiency of service is not 
in "substantial dispute." (Br. of Aplee. 32-33.) This argument simply ignores the 
evidence. As shown above, the affidavit submitted by CT Corp. sufficiently contradicts 
the constable's affidavit to create a material issue of fact. The district court cannot weigh 
the conflicting evidence without a hearing. 
Second, plaintiff argues that Rule 60(b) procedure does not allow for evidentiary 
hearings. (Br. of Aplee. 34.) Plaintiff cites no support for this proposition, and there is 
none. Rule 43(b), Utah R. Civ. P., authorizes the court to request oral testimony in 
deciding a motion. Moreover, when the parties' affidavits present a factual dispute, the 
trial court should set the matter for an evidentiary hearing. See Stan Katz Real Estate, 
Inc. v. Chavez, 565 P.2d 1142, 1143-44 (Utah 1977) (reversing the district court's refusal 
to set aside a default judgment in the face of disputed service of process). See also 
Interstate Excavating v. AGLA Development, supra, 611 P.2d at 371 (vacated default 
entered without evidentiary hearing to resolve conflicting evidence on service); Wood v. 
Weenig, supra, 736 P.2d at 1054 ("motion to set aside default judgment came on for an 
evidentiary hearing"); Davis v. Musler, supra, 713 F.2d at 916 (court should not hesitate 
to vacate default judgment "where further factfinding [is] necessary to ensure that 
substantial justice was served"). 
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Finally, plaintiff asserts that a hearing should be denied because none was 
requested in the district court. (Br. of Aplee. 37.) However, All American believed, and 
still maintains, that the dispute over service was sufficient in itself, without a hearing and 
without actual resolution, to justify relief from the default judgment. The most direct and 
efficient means to a just result was, and still is, simply to vacate the judgment and allow 
All American to accept a new service and address the merits, without resolving the 
dispute over the attempted initial service. In any event, this Court is authorized to order 
any just remedy, including an evidentiary hearing, if deemed necessary. 
POINT VI: THE DEFAULT SHOULD BE VACATED AT LEAST TO DELETE 
THE AWARD OF UNAUTHORIZED ATTORNEY FEES. 
All American demonstrated in its opening brief that the district court erred in 
awarding plaintiff attorney fees as part of the default judgment, (Br. of App. 23-24.) 
Plaintiff responds with only procedural objections, asserting that the issue was not raised 
below, and that the fee element of the judgment cannot be reviewed in a 60(b) motion. 
(Br. of Aplee. 39-40.) However, as noted previously, this Court is authorized to correct 
"plain error" even as to issues raised first on appeal. In re R.N.J., supra, 908 P.2d at 350. 
Moreover, Utah law, as opposed to the Idaho case cited by plaintiff, does permit review 
of the default judgment components on appeal. See Security Adjustment Bureau, supra, 
All P.2d at 215 (error in award of punitive damages "in and of itself justifies a vacation 
of the default"). Plaintiff does not dispute that the attorney fee award is entirely 
unauthorized by contract or statute, and that the district court lacked authority to grant the 
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award. Accordingly, this Court should vacate the judgment at least to allow deletion of 
the unauthorized attorney fee award. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, this Court should vacate the default judgment in its 
entirety and remand the case to allow All American to accept service and respond to 
plaintiffs claims on the merits. Alternatively, the Court should vacate the judgment and 
remand for an evidentiary hearing on the disputed issue of service of process. 
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